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It is well knovm that certain schemata of modal logic 
correspond to certain conditions on the relation of the Kripke 
models. E.g .. , one can prove that all instances of DA =>OOA 
are valid in a model structure if and only if the relation of the 
structure is transitive. 
In [1], S.K. Thomason mentions the problem of whether there is a 
schema of modal logic that corresponds in this sense to the rela-
tion being irreflexive. This problem is closely related to a re-
sult announced by Lemmon ffiLd Scott in [2], namely, that there is 
no schema Z such that a formula A is provable in the minimal 
(semi-)normal modal logic K with Z as added axiom schema if 
and only if A is valid in all irreflexive model structures. 
The proof was to be presented in later parts of [2]. They con-
jectured that the same is true of asymmetry and anti-symmetry. 
We shall present here a simple proof that no schema corresponds 
to any of these properties, nor to a certain generalization of 
the notion of intransitivity, or any property entailed by it. 
The notation is mainly taken from [3]. VVnen U is a set, R a 
binary relation over U and V a function from propositional 
variables to subsets of U , :f{ = (~ ,RX) is called a model 
structure (world system, frame) and ?~ = (U~,Ru,Vu> a model. 
When u1.e = u1c , R7.e = R:rt , ll is said to be a model on Jc . 
For u E U-ze. ~~A u is defined in the usual way and reads "A is 
true at u in u II • 
l=ti A means Vu E Uu. I=UA u ' 
and reads "A is true in U, II • 
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If .)fii A for some u , then U is said to be a coun termodel for 
u 
A • 't=:J{A means rtU on Jt ~ l=U.A ~ and reads "A is valid in :.R' 11 • 
vVhen Z is a schema, F~Z means: For all instances 
For typographical reasons we sometimes write 
u->~ 
and u* f=*A for l=u 7~A • 
A of z ' 
u j= A for 
K is the system that has modus ponens and necessitation as rules 
and the axiom schema 
in addition to axioms from some axiomatization of propositional 
logic with modus ponens as the only rule. 
The main point of this paper is the following lemma: 
LElVIJ):IA 1. If a formula B has a countermodel, then it has an 
asymmetric (and hence irreflexive and anti-symmetric) and intran-
sitive countermodel. 
Proof. Let 11= (U,R,V) and u be such that .¥u B • 
0 
Construct a new countermodel U-'~~ = (u-x-,Rl(-,v-x-) as follows: 
i) u.,~ consists of all finite seq_uenc8s 
u. E U for ]. 0 < i < n and 
(Call them R-seq_uences.) 
u.Ru. 1 ]. J.+ 
(u ,u1 , ••• ,u) where o n 
for 0 < i < n-1 • 
ii) (u0 , ••• ,um)R*(u0 , ••• ,un) holds iff (u0 , ••• ,un) = 
(u0 ,. • .,um>*<un> , where -:f is the "clash" or concaten-
ation operation of sequences. 
iii) For atomic formulas A, (u0 , ••• ,un> E V*(A) iff un EV(A). 
We shall prove that if (u0 , ••• , un) E U""c , then (u0 , ••• ,un> l=* A 
iff un l= A , or, when u' denotes the last element of 
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u'~ E U'~: u* 1=* A iff u 1 F= A , for all formulas A • The proof 
goes by induction: 
at~ For atomic formulas A 
u* I=* A <-> u* E v-x-(A) <-> u' E= V(A) <-> u' l= A • 
I) u ~~ ~* .., A <-> I u * I=* A <-> luI F A <-> u' l= I A • 
" ) u -)(- 1=-)(- A " B <-> u * I=* A & u -X- I=* B ~-> u ' I= A & u ' I= B 
<-> u' I= Af\B. 
0) u* 11'- OA <-> V(u0 , ••• ,un) EU*(u*R-K-(u0 , ... ,un)-(u0 , ••• ,~)1=*A) 
<-> \f(u0 , ••• ,un) EU'~((u0 , ••• ,un)=u**(un> _, uni=A) 
<-> \i'un E U(u'R un _. un i= A) <-> u' != OA • 





And R* is asymmetric 
QED. 
Instead of this induction we could have used the p-morphism 
theorem. Let 
Define U Uo 
ping from U* to 
mean ax1 , ••• , xn_ 1 ~ xRx1 A x 1 Rx2 A ••• Axn_1 Ry • 
It is easy to check that the map-
which takes u* into u' (the last ele-
ment of u* ) is a p-morphism, reliable on every propositional 
letter. See (3]. 
The model constructed in the above proof has the form of a tree, 
and, of course, is not just asymmetric and intransitive. It has 
all properties which can be expressed by a sentence of the form 
for m I p , 
or of the form 
(2) 
m 
AxRu1 ".u1Ru2 A ••• Au 1Ry _. /1. (z. =u.)), m- O<i<m l l for 2 < m . 
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Let us call the property of satisfying (1)m~p , for, m I p, 
m,p-intransitivity, and the property expressed by (2)m, for 2_::m~ 
m,m-intransitivi~. 
Then we see that: 
irreflexivity is 1,0-intransitivity; 
asymmetry is 2,0-intransitivity; 
intransitivity is 2,1-intransitivity. 
If we restrict ourselves to connected model structures, the class 
of model structures obtained from arbitrary model structures by 
the construction in the above proof is determined up to isomor-
phism by the L -sentence 
w1 (.OJ 
(3) A (1) A J\(2) 
mfp m~p 2<m m 
i.e~ , we have: 
J4.J ( ) LEMMA 2. r. is connected i.e. , u.,.,c is of the form Uu and sa tis-
o 
fies (3) as an ordinary relational structure for the first order 
language with one binary relation symbol ((UX,RJi;l=(3)) iff~ 
is isomorphic to a model structure obtained by the construdtion 
in the proof of Lemma 1. 
Proof. If Jr: is isomorphic to a model structure obtained by the 
construction, then it certainly is connected and satisfies (3). 
If J{ is connected and satisfies (3), then use the construction 
on .k itself, starting with some u 0 from which all points in 
the structure can be reached, and obtain 1{~~- Then .7{ ~ J{-r' is 
For .J( l= (3) im-
plies that if two ~-sequences, at least one of them of length 
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greater than 2 , have the same last element, they are equal. If 
two R~-sequences have the same last element and neither of them 
has length greater that 2 , then they are trivially equal, since 
all ~-sequences begin with u 
0 
and IU Rv u • 
0 -'to 0 
This means that we can state the full strength of the proof of 
Lemma 1 as: 
LEMMA 3. L by (3), then 
w1w 
If (*) is any sentence implied in 
if a modal formula has a countermodel, it has a countermodel sa-
tisfying (*). 
A class of model structures ~ is said to determine a modal logic 
S if for all formulas A 1-s A <-> V X( J.C E 1; ---t \=.1< A) • A proper~ 
ty of model structures is said to determine a logic if the class 
of model structures having the property determines it. 
THEOREM 1. If(*) is any sentence implied by (3), K is determined 
by the property of satisfying ( •'f) ("determined by ( *)"). 
Proof. We have 1-K A <:-> '\/ ]{. f:J(A • Hence, one way is immediate. 
If ~KA , then A has a countermodel, and hence, by Lemma 3, a 
countermodel satisfying (*). 
COROLLARY. There is no schema Z such that K ~ KZ and KZ is 
determined by (*), for any (*) implied by (3). In particular we 
can take as (*) the sentence expressing irreflexivity, or asymme-
try, anti-symmetry or intransitivity. 
COROLLARY. Every class of model structures between the class of 
all ]{ and the class of X satisfying ( 3) determines the logic K. 
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A schema Z is said to correspond to a property if ~~Z iff J{ 
has the property. 
THEOREM 2. There is no schema Z corresponding to any property 
which can be expressed by a sentence (*) implied by (3), except 
the trivial property of just being a model structure. 
Proof. Suppose there was such a schema Z • There exists a model 
not satisfying (*). It must be a countermodel for some instance 
of Z • Hence, by Lemma 3, this instance has a countermodel sa-
tisfying (*), which contradicts the assumption. 
We now admit more than one relation in the model structures 
and more than one necessity operator. The necessity operator be-
longing to a relation R is denoted fB) , etc. Kn is the n-modal 
system (system with n necessity operators) where we have the K-
axiom and necessitation for all operators. Below, ~ is supposed 
to range over model structures with the appropriate number of re-
lations, ~< being one of them. 
THEOREM 3. For any sentence (*) implied by (3), the property 
that R~ satisfies (*) determines Kn • For any (*) implied by 
(3), except the trivial sentence, no schema in the language of Kn 
corresponds to the property that R~ satisfies (*). 
Proof. We have to generalize our Lemma 3. Given a model 
?.l = ( U ,R, ••• , V) , let T be the union of the n relations of U. 
Let U* be the set of all (finite) T-sequences beginning with u 0 • 
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For all relations s of U 9 define by 
iff u* = u**<u''> 2 1 2' and U ' S u' 1 2 • 
For atomic A let u* E V*(A) iff u' E V(A) • 
Then for all S of 1.-i 9 the inductive clause lli)) is proved as 
[]) is proved in Lemm~ 1. 
Could we add an axiom schema to some system other than K , 
a system which is determined by some property, and get a new sys-
tem which is determined by, for example, irreflexivity and the 
given property? Is there a schema corresponding to irreflexivity 
together with some other property to which a conjunct of the sche-
rna corresponds? 
We do not try to answer the general question but restrict ourselves 
to systems obtained by adding to K some of the axiom schemas 
G' m,n,p,q 
In [2] there are given completeness results for all these systems, 
with respect to the properties expressed by 
We may argue roughly as follows (deta~ of the argument is given 
below)~ 
We have the system KG I • m,n 9 p,q (Or a system with several G1 -
schemas added to K.) All theorems in the system are valid in 
all model structures satisfying (in the following we 
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omit the parameters m,n,p~q)~ hence in all model structures sa-
tisfying g 1 and conjuncts of ( 3) which are consistent with g' • 
Conversely, given a non-theorem of the theory, it has a counter-
model U satisfying g 1 • "Unravel" U as in the proof of 
Lemma 1, getting U* . I) 0* Take the closure of ~ with respect to 
1'\J 
g I o (}0 U* The new model uv behaves like , and satisfies g 1 and 
some of the conjuncts of (3). The conju..n.cts of (3) (or more gene-
rally, the sentences implied by (3)) which are "saved" by this 
construction, no matter what countermodel we started with, express 
properties which cannot be matched by any schemas added to the 
system. 
Examples show that not all conjuncts of (3) which are consistent 
with g 1 are saved. The difficult problem then is to determine 
what conjuncts of (3) are saved. 
'I/} ·)I; We have to be more precise about the phrase "the closure of (..{., 
with respect to g 1 "· 
Let Uu = (Uu ,R ~ uu ) , l(u·:<-) 
0 0 0 
the (i+1)st element of u* , u' 
before, and u*lj = (u , ••• ,u. 1> 0 J-
be the length of u* 
' 






If U satisfies g 1 and u 0 E U , then m,n,p,q U also satis-u 0 
fies g' m,n,p,q • Unravel 1t from u 0 and get U* . 
For all t that we can "find" by the existential quantifier in 
0 
· d f 11 ~ * E u* , 1·f g ' g1 ven any u, v, w , an or a u" , v 
m,n,p,q 
3:j~O: u*lj = v-'<-lj 
and 
l(u*) = m+n+j, l(v·x·) = p+q+j , 
u 1 = v' = t 0 
then identify u* and v* and the trees above them (i.e. delete 
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v* and the tree over it from U* and substitute "arrows" point-
"'-" 
ing to v* with "arrows" pointing to u7E- ) . We get ~u • 
Since u* and v* uk are copies in ,, of the same point, t in 
0 ' 
1_f, the trees over u* and v~* in 11.,* are isomorphic and the 
valuation over the trees is the same. Hence, for all formulas A 9 
......., 
if ( u 0 , ••• 9 un) E U , i. e. , U , ?1./* and are equivalent. 
"" We shall prove that 'lt satisfies g I o 
m,n,p,q Let u *, v* , w* E U 9 
v* 
= u * * < vk ' • • • ' vk 1 ) 1-m 1-
w* = u * * < wk , ••• , v11 1 > 2-p c2-
so we have v Rm v and w RP w and k 1-m-1 k 1-1 k 2-p-1 k 2-1 ' 
= wk 1 = u' • 2-P-
Since is satisfied by 11 there is a t E U 
0 
that and q wk 1 R t • 2- 0 I.e., there exist in 
x1 9 • • • 'xn-1 'Y 1 ' • • • 9 Y q-1 such that 
such 
u 
v* -* < x 1 9 ••• 9 xn_ 1 , t 0 ) E u* and wi<- -* < y 1 , ••• , y q- 1 , t 0 > E u* • 
But these two R1L- sequences must have been identified in the con-
"" 
struction of f/.t • Hence there is a t* E U such that v* Rnt* 0 0 
and 
We may now get theorems of the following kind: 
K + the schema G' m, 1,o,o 
m ( 0 0 A :::> A) is determined not only 
by the property expressed by g' but also by the property 
m,1 ,o,o 
expressed by g' 1 '' A (1) , • m, ,o,o o<m'<m m ,o 
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K + the schema G' (0 A :J Op A) 
o, 1 ,p,o 
by the property expressed by g' o,1,p,o 
expressed by g' 1 1\ A (1) I • 
o, ,p,o o<m' m ,o 
But these theorems are rather limited. 
is determined not only 
but also by the property 
More general cases are 
either difficult to analyse or are such that every conjunct of (3) 
is violated by construction from some countermodel. 
If we knew enough about the different systems to be able to choose 
our countermodels suitably~ the matter might be considerably sim-
plified. 
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